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The Effect of Perception on Reactions to Reapportionment
TRUMAN DA YID WOOD
Mankato State College
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ABSTRACT-A port of the legislative reapportionment conflict in Minnesota was a product of distorted perceptions by political actors such as the Minnesota Form Bureau . The Bureau's reaction
to the Governor's Commission on Legislative Reapportionment was o result of the impact of the
Bureau's ideology on its perception of the political system. The resultant failure of the Form Bureau President to serve on the Governor's Commission denied that organization access to on important step in the decision-making process concerning legislative reapportionment .

Political conflict is a result of perceived differences between and among political actors. The matter of perception is of distinct importance. The human being who accidentally ventures near a wasp's nest is perceived by the
wasp as a threat to his security. The wasp attacks the
human, even though the human had no real intention of
bothering the wasp or his nest. So too, political contlict
often arises or is intensified as a resu'1t of distorted perceptions of the political behavior of others or of the po1,itical context.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the political
problem of legislative reapportionment and the conflicts
arising therefrom in the state of Minnesota with particular reference to the effect of perception on the reactions
of various political actors. The principal actors focused
upon are (I) the Governor's Bipartisan Commission on
Legislative Reapportionment and its Advisory Subcommittee and (2) the Minnesota Farm Bureau .
The Minnesota Farm Bureau's idea of a legislature
was one composed of two houses, based on population,
reflecting urban interests, and one based on area, refiecting rural-agricultural interests. This idea was resoundingly rejected by Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren in
Reynolds v. Sims: " Legislatures represent people , not
trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters , not
farms or cities or economic interests . . . . Th e fact that
an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote .
. .. We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the
equal protection clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis.' '
Two events in the summer of 1964 brought th e reapportionment conllict to the Minnesota scene. One was
the suit brought in federal district court (Honsey v.
Donovan) asking that the Minnesota legislative apportionment law of 1959 be declared invalid on the grounds
that it violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S . Constitution. The second
was Governor Karl Rolvaag's appointment of the Gov1 B.S., Manka10 State College ; M .A . and Ph.D. , St ale University
of Iowa . Chairman, Advisory Subcommitte of Political Scientists
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ernor's Bipartisan Commission on Legislative Reapportionment. The Commission was to make recommendations to the Governor on legislative reapportionment
that he , in turn could submit to the 1965 legislature.
The Chairman of the Governor's Bipartisan Commission on Legislative Reapportionment ( GBCLR) was
Franklin Rogers, editor of the Mankato Free Press. Mr.
Rogers asked the author of thi s paper to form an Advisory Subcommittee of political scientists and other interested experts to perform the roles of ( I ) providing
summarized background information in the form of
study papers on subjects related to legislative reapportionment, (2) providing staff assistance to the GBCLR ,
and ( 3 ) informing the public of the problem of reaportionment.
The Governor, in presenting his written mandate to
the GBCLR, had indicated that its responsibility was to
present proposals for legislative reapportionment within
the confines of the U.S. Con stitution as interpreted by
the U.S . Supreme Court and the Minnesota Constitution.
In his oral mandate to the Commission , the Governor
had presented numerous directly related topics that he
perceived to be within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Ultimately , most of these topics were treated in
study papers by members of the Advisory Subcommittee
and submitted to the GBCLR and, finally , in the report
to the Governor.
The Governor had correctly perceived the direct relation between many of the orally suggested topics and
the central issue of reapportionment, but he had failed to
recognize that a citizens' committee, such as the GBCLR,
simply could not cope with the complexity of the issues,
as outlined orally by the Governor, without governmentally authorized fi scal resources. Having no such
funds, the GBCLR was thus dependent upon the voluntary staff assistance of the Advisory Subcommittee .
The GBCLR and the Advisory Subcommittee were
perceived by the public as one single entity rathe r than
as a citizens' committee served by a voluntary professional staff. The single entity was not perceived by aU
actors in the political con!Jict in the same way.
To the legislature, the GBCLR was perceived as an
instrumentality of the Governor and legislative reapportionment itself was perceived as a legislative matter exclusively, and the Governor therefore, should have refrained from interfering in the area. The Governor was
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unable to persuade any legislator to serve on the G BCLR
although, ultimately, two ex-legislators, Peter Popovich
and Chris Erickson, did serve on the Commission.
To the Minnesota Farm Bureau, the GBCLR was not
politically acceptable. Governor Rolvaag had originally
appointed representatives from three major farm organizations in Minnesota to the GBCLR: Clarence W. Myers, President of the Minnesota Farm Bureau; Archie
Baumann, Secretary of the Minnesota Farmers Union;
and William Pearson, Master of the Minnesota State
Grange. No one was appointed to represent the National
Farmers Organization, perhaps because the NFO was the
first farm organization to clearly recognize the decline in
the farmers' political power and to shift its major emphasis from political to economic pressure. The Minnesota
Farm Bureau did not take the NFO's position nor did it
choose to play a role in the GBCLR.
On August 14, 1964, Minnesota F arm Bureau President Clarence W. Myers sent a letter of resignation to
Governor Karl Rolvaag. Myers' resignation from the
GBCLR was a decision fraught with conflict. Franklin
Rogers, Chairman of the GBCLR, indicated that Myers
had expressed a desire to resign on three previous occasions, but each time Rogers had been able to convince
Myers of the desirability of Myers' remaining on the
Commission. Although it is difficult to specifically locate
or trace the exact source of pressure, it seems apparent
that there was within the Farm Bureau considerable
pressure on Myers to maintain a solid front against the
June 15, 1964 Supreme Court decision and any of its
resultant political products. This pressure manifested itself in Myers' letter of resignation to the Governor which
stated in part, "When I was contacted originally by your
office to serve on this Special Commission on Reapportionment , it was my opinion that this commission would
give consideration to apportionment along the lines of
our Farm Bureau policy, which calls for a state constitutional amendment to provide for an area house as well
as a population house in Minnesota. However, in reading the charge to the commission, which directs it to
draw up a proposal for reapportionment consistent with
our current state constitution and the U.S. Supreme
Court decision, I find that I could not make a contribution as it would be in direct conflict with our policy."
Although the position on legislative reapportionment
of the Minnesota Farmers Union and the Minnesota
State Grange was similar to that of the Farm Bureau ,
neither of these two farm organizations took the adamant stand of the Farm Bureau in regard to the GBCLR .. Part of this may be a result of the questionable
historical analysis of American political theory put forth
by Charles B. Shuman, President of the American Farm
Bureau Federation, which has affected the perception of
political reality by state and local Farm Bureau leaders
and members.
Shuman and the Farm Bureau leadership maintain that
( 1) county and local government bears the same relation
to state government as state government does to the national federal government-the so-called federal analogy;
( 2) the majority is not always right and therefore a
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check and balance system of one house of the legislature
based on area and one house based on population is absolutely imperative to preserve the rights of the rural
minority; and (3) the battle is not rural versus urban
but a battle to preserve representative government. These
three positions, in the view of the Farm Bureau, are the
traditional essence of the American political system ; any
deviation from them is totally new, different, and dangerous.
Although Reynolds v. Sims is frequently cited by the
Farm Bureau leadership in its denunciations of the trend
in legislative reapportionment, there has been an unwillingness to acknowledge the brief history of American
political theory contained in it that refutes the questionable historical analysis of Shuman and his colleagues.
Chief Justice Warren said, "We . . . find the federal analogy inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting
schemes. Attempted reliance on the federal analogy appears often to be little more than an after-the-fact rationalization offered in defense of maladjusted state apportionment arrangements. The original constitutions of 36
of our States provided that representation in both houses
of the state legislature would be based completely, or
predominantly, on population . And the Founding Fathers clearly had no intention of establishing a pattern
or model for the apportionment of seats in state legislatures when the system of representation in the Federal
Congress was adopted. Demonstrative of this is the fact
that the Northwest Ordinance adopted in the same year
... as the Federal Constitution, provided for the apportionment of seats in territorial legislatures solely on the
basis of population .... Political subdivisions of Statescounties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have
been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have
been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions."
The Farm Bureau had a different perception of the
American political system than the U.S. Supreme Court.
The former perceived the system in terms of the actual
apportionment of the state legislatures in the pre-1964
period. This was, in spite of state constitutional instructions to the contrary in many states, a malapportionment
that tended to make area a factor in representation .
An excellent example of this perception of political
reality by political actors was continually confronted by
the GBCLR. In the public hearings conducted by the
GBCLR, citizen after citizen, most of whom were from
rural areas, testified that they wanted the Minnesota
Constitution to continue to provide for one legislative
house based on area and one legislative house based on
population. Judge J. H. Sylvestre, member of the
GBCLR, would frequently inquire of these witnesses as
to whether they were aware that the Minnesota Constitution provided for both legislative houses to be based
on population . The answer was uniformly in the negative.
Because the Minnesota Farm Bureau perceived the
U.S. Supreme Court's reapportionment decision as altering the political system of the state, it chose as its politi-
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cal strategy in the reapportionment conflict, ( l) nonparticipation in the GBCLR and (2) concerted political
pressure for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that
would allow the citizens of the respective states to decide by referendum whether one house of its state legislature should be based on a factor other than population.
The Minnesota Farm Bureau's strategy was a calculated risk based on the assumption that ( l ) the
GBCLR would not prove to be a significant political
force, and, even if it did, that the Farm Bureau through
Myers could not produce changes that would conform
to the Farm Bureau objectives, and that (2) it was politically possible to successfully amend the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution as desired by the
Farm Bureau.
The Minnesota Farm Bureau underestimated the political power of the GBCLR. Although the reapportionment measure that may have passed the Minnesota legislature may not be an exact replica of the GBCLR proposal, the GBCLR did have the following effects: ( l)
It helped to create an increased public awareness of the
reapportionment issue and ( 2) it provided the legislature with certain criteria and information, with the result that the legislature began work on reapportionment
earlier than was generally expected and with greater adherence to the criteria than was generally predicted .
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Myers' failure to serve on the GBCLR meant that
there was no opportunity for the Minnesota Farm Bureau to pressure for recommendations such as weighted
voting, which might have been politically advantageous
to rural-agricultural interests. The Minnesota Farm Bureau thus excluded itself from an important step in the
decision-making process concerning legislative reapportionment.
It remains to be seen whether the Farm Bureau's paramount reliance on constitutional amendments was an
advantageous choice in political strategy.
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